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Vaccination coverage rates often mask wide variation in access, uptake, and cost of providing vaccination.
Financial incentives have been effective at creating demand for social services in a variety of settings.
Using methods of extended cost-effectiveness analysis, we compare the health and economic implica-
tions of three different vaccine delivery strategies for measles vaccination in Ethiopia: i) routine im-
munization, ii) routine immunization with ﬁnancial incentives, and iii) mass campaigns, known as
supplemental immunization activities (SIAs). We examine annual birth cohorts of almost 3,000,000
births over a ten year period, exploring variation in these outcomes based on economic status to un-
derstand how various options may improve equity. SIAs naturally achieve higher levels of vaccine
coverage, but at higher costs. Routine immunization combined with ﬁnancial incentives bolsters demand
among more economically vulnerable households. The relative appeal of routine immunization with
ﬁnancial incentives and SIAs will depend on the policy environment, including short-term ﬁnancial
limitations, time horizons, and the types of outcomes that are desired. While the impact of ﬁnancial
incentives has been more thoroughly studied in other policy arenas, such as education, consideration of
this approach alongside standard vaccination models such as SIAs is timely given the dialog around
measles eradication.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Vaccination has long been regarded as an effective and inex-
pensive means of improving mortality and morbidity in developing
countries (Bloom et al., 2005). Despite the proven beneﬁts, chal-
lenges remain in improving and maintaining coverage. One
dilemma countries face in the battle against vaccine-preventable
diseases is the choice between improving coverage of existing
vaccines and rolling out new vaccinations to the current pool of
reached individuals. Embodied in this tension is the importance
placed on addressing disparities in health care access and reaching
out to marginalized populations (Delamonica et al., 2005).Soto Street, Pittsburgh, 15261
oston, MA 02215, USA.
), verguet@hsph.harvard.edu
r Ltd. This is an open access articleWhile vaccination remains an individual decision, govern-
ments and donor agencies have mounted a variety of outreach
efforts to increase access to and demand for vaccination (Duclos
et al., 2009; Organization & UNICEF, 2001; Strebel et al., 2003).
These efforts may in part be driven by the oft-cited positive ex-
ternalities of vaccination, and the broader links between popu-
lation health and economic growth (Andre et al., 2008;
B€arnighausen et al., 2011; Bloom et al., 2005; Ehreth, 2003;
Stack et al., 2011). Supplementary immunization activities (SIAs),
or mass campaigns, provide supplemental doses in addition to the
doses prescribed in the standard vaccination schedule (World
Health Organization, 2009). These outreach efforts to increase
not only coverage but also the intensity of coverage are especially
important in the context of disease elimination goals, such as the
regional measles elimination efforts led by the World Health Or-
ganization (WHO) (Christie and Gay, 2011; Organization, 2011;
Strebel et al., 2011).under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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population with a strategy that will increase demand for vaccina-
tion. Coverage is typically geographically clustered, and high-
coverage areas are both observably and unobservably different
from low-coverage areas (Morris et al., 2013). For example, remote
areas with limited health care access are less likely to be reached
through routine immunization (Okwaraji et al., 2012), and mass
campaigns or canvassers may be more appropriate in these settings
than in more urban environments where media campaigns may
have broader reach and routine care is more accessible (Kirigia and
Barry, 2008). This geographic variation in demand creates variation
in the optimal outreach strategy based on the existing level of
coverage. Thus, approaches that were successful early on, for
example in improving coverage from 15% to 25%, may no longer be
optimal when attempting to boost coverage from 80% to 90%. This
variation in the relative value of different strategies reﬂects changes
in both the costs of the strategies and their marginal impact on
demand. This is partly due to sociodemographic and geographic
shifts in the unvaccinated population as the coverage rate in-
creases; demand-side factors such as parents' education have been
shown to affect the demand for vaccination (Xie and Dow, 2005).
Thus, policymaking around improving vaccination coverage
must consider not only the supply of vaccinations, which includes
the delivery mechanism, but also the demand for these services.
Other types of social interventions, such as those with educational
goals, have commonly linked socially desirable goals with ﬁnancial
incentives to create demand. Conditional cash transfers (CCTs) are
one approach that uses this mechanism by making cash or other
transfers to enrollees who complete certain requirements. These
programs are typically means-tested or proxy means-tested, using
indicators to capture characteristics reﬂective of economic status
such as education, housing quality, and asset ownership (Australian
Agency for International Development, 2011). These programs have
largely been undertaken in Latin America, including high-proﬁle
programs such as Oportunidades in Mexico and Bolsa Familia in
Brazil (Handa and Davis, 2006). Typically, these larger-scale pro-
grams include educational requirements, such as school enrollment
and attendance, as well as health stipulations, such as well-child
visits and completed vaccinations. The motivation for these cash
transfers is both outcome-speciﬁc, in creating demand for worth-
while health and social services, and broadly welfare-oriented, in
more generally attempting to break the poverty cycle (Ranganathan
and Lagarde, 2012). Improvements in vaccination coverage have
been associated with CCTs in Colombia, Honduras, Mexico, and
Nicaragua, though there is variation in the time frame, age range,
and speciﬁc vaccinations where impact was identiﬁed (Barham
et al., 2007; Barham and Maluccio, 2009; Lagarde et al., 2007;
Ranganathan and Lagarde, 2012). Transfer sizes in these programs
varied signiﬁcantly, from 10% to 30% of annual mean household
consumption, and all programs had stipulations regarding both
school attendance and preventive health care. A randomized
controlled study of an immunization-speciﬁc incentive program in
India that used non-cash transfers found modest effects on im-
munization rates (Banerjee et al., 2010).
Vaccine delivery strategies have the potential to effect change
across multiple social domains. The fundamental health impact is a
function of either improving access, in the case where there is
insufﬁcient supply, or incentivizing uptake, in the case of lackluster
demand. Financial beneﬁts may be realized through averted
household health expenditures, or, in the case of ﬁnancial in-
centives, additional income. This increase in household resources
can potentially have long-term implications for economically
vulnerable households by avoiding the poverty trap of poor health
and even providing them the capital to move out of poverty.
This paper evaluates three different measles vaccine deliverystrategies in Ethiopia using extended cost-effectiveness analysis
(ECEA) (Verguet et al., 2015a,b,c; Verguet et al., 2013b). Speciﬁcally,
we examine the health, ﬁnancial, and social implications of routine
immunization programs, SIAs, and routine immunization with
ﬁnancial incentives. As of 2009, routine services provided coverage
to 56% of the population, with rates as lowas 30% in the rural region
of Affar and as high as 90% in Addis Ababa (Central Statistical
Agency (Ethiopia) & ICF International, 2011). Lower rates are
evident in more rural areas, where 80% of the population live
(Commission, 2008). In addition to routine immunization, Ethiopia
has implemented SIAs since 2002 (Mitiku et al., 2011). Given the
distribution of various characteristics that affect the ease of supply
and the elasticity of demand for vaccination, ECEA is an appropriate
method because it considers the distributional impacts of the
various strategies. The ﬁndings will thus support tailoring the
approach to the target population.
2. Methods
ECEA extends cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) by considering
additional, policy-relevant metrics that account for the economic
and social effects of poor health (Verguet et al., 2015a,b Verguet
et al., 2013b). Thus, rather than simply conducting an economic
evaluation of measles vaccination, this study looks at this inter-
vention in the context of three different policy instruments. The
broader household and economic effects of these policies are
evaluated, including deaths averted, household expenditures
averted and ﬁnancial risk protection (FRP) provided, and govern-
ment costs. There is an emphasis on the distribution of effects
across income quintiles, which speaks to the equity impacts of the
different approaches.
2.1. Mortality distribution
Most evidence on child mortality inequalities is not disease-
speciﬁc, as reported in the Demographic and Health Surveys
(DHS) (Central Statistical Agency (Ethiopia) & ICF International,
2011). However a few studies highlight particular cases; for
example, Rheingans et al. (2012) estimated rotavirus-speciﬁc
mortality in 25 GAVI-eligible countries. In this vein, we estimate
measles mortality by income group for Ethiopia using a similar
disease-focused methodology. Speciﬁcally, we distribute the total
under-ﬁve deaths due to measles using a ‘risk index’ that varies
between income groups: we estimate a relative risk ratio in dying
from measles between two income groups I and J as proxied by:
RI
RJ

5q0I 

1 CovIVeff

5q0J 

1 CovJVeff
 ; (1)
where 5q0I is the under-ﬁvemortality rate in income group I, CovI is
the coverage of the ﬁrst dose of measles vaccine (MCV1) in income
group I, as indicated by the DHS (Central Statistical Agency
(Ethiopia) & ICF International, 2011), and Veff is the effectiveness
for MCV1 (Sudfeld et al., 2010). The risk index (e.g. RJ) in equation
(1) is estimated as an average of a proxy for the relative probability
of being infected withmeasles (i.e. not being effectively vaccinated)
and a proxy for the relative probability of dying from measles (i.e.
captured by under-ﬁve mortality). This approach to representing
the risk differentials across quintiles assumes that, for each quintile,
the risk of infection is proportional to within-quintile vaccination
coverage, implying no indirect protection. Likewise, it is also
assumed that the case fatality rate of measles is proportional to the
under-5 mortality rate. The relative risk ratio between quintiles
enables distributing the total under-ﬁve deaths due to measles in
Table 1
Parameters used for the economic evaluation of measles vaccination strategies in Ethiopia.
Parameter Value Sources
Under-5 deaths due to measles 2010 10,450 per income group (from poorest to
richest): 3154; 2470; 2099; 1939; 787
Liu et al. (2012); Authors' estimates based on Central Statistical Agency
(Ethiopia) & ICF International (2011)
Relative risk ratio of mortality, from poorest to richest
(income quintile 1e5)
1.51; 1.18; 1.00; 0.93; 0.38 Based on Central Statistical Agency (Ethiopia) & ICF International
(2011) and applied to total under-5 deaths due to measles
MCV1 effectiveness 0.85 Sudfeld et al. (2010)
SIA effectiveness 0.95 Sudfeld et al. (2010)
Coverage of measles vaccine (MCV1), from poorest to
richest (income quintile 1e5), before any program
45%; 52%; 52%; 56%; 80% Central Statistical Agency (Ethiopia) & ICF International (2011)
Gradual annual coverage of MCV1 after P1 1% per year, across all income groups Authors' assumptions
Gradual annual coverage of MCV1 after P2 1% per year, across all income groups
Coverage increase of MCV1 after P2, through ﬁnancial
incentive
10% in bottom two income quintiles
SIA coverage after P3 90% across all income groups
Inpatient visit cost $17.69 Based on Stack et al. (2011); World Health Organization (2002)
Outpatient visit cost $1.77
Inpatient visit cost paid out-of-pocket $6.01 Authors' assumptions based on Global Health Expenditure Database
(2012)Outpatient visit cost paid out-of-pocket $0.60
Transport costs $8.37 World Bank Ethiopia: A country status report on health and poverty,
Volume 2, Main Report. The World Bank: Washington, DC; (2005).
Probability of inpatient visit 0.02 per measles case Authors' assumptions based on Bishai et al. (2010)
Probability of outpatient visit 0.10 per measles case
MCV1 cost per child immunized $1.22 Grifﬁths et al. (2009)
Levin et al. (2010)SIA cost per child immunized $1.05
Amount of ﬁnancial incentive $14 Authors' assumptions based on (Ranganathan and Lagarde (2012))
Administrative costs for P2 10% of total vaccination costs Authors' assumptions based on Grosh (2008)
Ethiopia's gross domestic product per capita $360 World Development Indicators (2013)
Ethiopia's Gini index 0.30
P1, gradual increase of MCV1 of 1% per year; P2, gradual increase of MCV1 of 1% per year supplemented by ﬁnancial incentives to the bottom two income quintiles; P3,
supplemental immunization activity.
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mates and ensuing distribution of measles mortality across the
different income groups. These mortality ‘gradients’ are used as
baseline estimates in our subsequent distributional analysis for
measles deaths.2.2. Evaluation of measles vaccination programs
We examine annual birth cohorts of 2,970,200 over a ten year
period (United Nations Population Division Department of
Economic and Social Affairs, 2013). We evaluate three measles
vaccination programs: incremental increases in MCV1 (P1); incre-
mental increases in MCV1, supplemented by ﬁnancial incentives
(FIs) for the bottom two income groups conditional on obtaining
MCV1 (P2); supplemental immunization activity (SIA) of a sup-
plementary dose of measles vaccine, offered to children aged 6-59
months-old (P3). For P1, we assume the program would increase
current coverage levels by 1 percentage point per year over ten
years for each income group (Central Statistical Agency (Ethiopia)&
ICF International, 2011). For P2, we assume the program would
increase current coverage levels by 1 percentage point per year
over ten years for each income group, supplemented by a ﬁxed 10
percentage point increase in the bottom two income groups who
would be the groups receiving the FIs. Ten percentage points in-
crease is meant to capture an achievable coverage for the health
system given that current routine coverage levels are low (Central
Statistical Agency (Ethiopia) & ICF International, 2011). For P3, we
assume that over 10 years there would be two SIAs reaching about
90% of children aged 6e59 months, consistent with the frequency
and high coverage of SIA observed in many sub-Saharan African
countries (Masresha et al., 2011).
For P1 and P2, we follow Ethiopia's births cohort (almost
3,000,000 live births (United Nations Population Division
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2013)) over the ﬁrst
ﬁve years of life. For P3, we follow Ethiopia's 6e59 months oldpopulation up to age ﬁve. Measles-related mortality outcomes and
measles treatment expenditures averted are estimated for these
population groups. The ﬁve-year age horizon captures all relevant
effects with simplicity: the relevant populations are modeled, and
under-ﬁve children constitute the population group in which out-
comes mostly occur and for whom data (e.g. burden of disease) is
available. We adopt a societal perspective and consider the vacci-
nation costs andmeasles treatment costs borne by the government,
separated from the measles-related OOP expenditures (both
treatment and transport) borne by patients and their families.
Using baseline information about measles prevalence and
measles vaccination coverage by income quintile, for each vacci-
nation program we estimate the level and distribution (across in-
come groups) of the measles deaths averted; the households'
expenditures (direct medical costs and transport costs) related to
measles treatment averted, the costs to sustain the program
(vaccination costs borne by the government) and the measles
treatment costs averted from the government's perspective; and
the FRP afforded by the program measured by an imputed percent
change in individual income after implementation of either vacci-
nation program. Ethical approval was not required because this
study used publicly available secondary data that did not contain
any identiﬁable private information.2.3. Data sources
Values for all parameters are listed (Table 1). Before program
introduction, individuals pay out of pocket for measles treatment
and the cost of this service is assumed to be of about a third of the
total healthcare treatment costs (Global Health Expenditure
Database, 2012). Vaccine effectiveness is assumed to be 85% for
MCV1 and 95% for SIAs, respectively (Sudfeld et al., 2010); the
higher efﬁcacy for SIAs reﬂects the fact that this platform tends to
vaccinate older children (those older than twelve months of age).
All costs are expressed in 2012 US$ using Ethiopia's consumer price
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MCV1 vaccine price is about $0.58 and MCV1 cost of delivery is
about $0.64 (Grifﬁths et al., 2009); SIA delivery cost is about $1.05
(Levin et al., 2010). For each incremental child immunized with
MCV1, we assume an additional cost of $0.09 if MCV1 coverage is
below 80% and of $0.19 if MCV1 coverage is above 80% (Levin et al.,
2010). These costs strictly reﬂect the direct costs associated with
the program, and do not capture opportunity costs or other indirect
costs.2.4. Measles deaths averted
The model follows the country birth cohort (or 6-59 months-
olds) up to age ﬁve, and uses the indicator of relative measles
mortality (risk index) varying by income group in order to quantify
the reductions in under-ﬁve mortality due to measles, an approach
which was implemented elsewhere (Rheingans et al., 2012). Spe-
ciﬁcally, we use a measure of annual deaths due to measles among
those ages 1e59 months of age (Liu et al., 2012). Before each
vaccination program, the measles burden is distributed across in-
come groups, based on the risk index speciﬁed by income group
(Table 1). The approach is static; in the case of measles, vaccination
may provide some protection to unvaccinated individuals due to
herd immunity. Dynamic modeling capturing herd effects and
seasonality could address these issues (Anderson et al., 1991;
Keeling and Rohani, 2008).2.5. Government costs
From the government's perspective, we estimate the total costs
of each vaccination program, depending on the program imple-
mented. P1 and P3 delivery costs have been described above. For
P2, the implementation of a ﬁnancial incentive is assumed to lead
to additional administrative costs estimated at 10% of total vacci-
nation costs, based on assessments from other programs (Grosh,
2008).2.6. Consequences for households and ﬁnancial risk protection
afforded
From the patient perspective, we estimate (by income group)
the amount of household expenditures averted for measles treat-
ment following each program introduction. They represent cost
savings from the household perspective. In Ethiopia, for the pop-
ulations followed up to age ﬁve, measles-related expenditures
borne by families, with and without vaccination, are estimated and
depend on probabilities of outpatient/inpatient visits for measles-
related outpatient/inpatient visits. Direct medical costs from
outpatient/inpatient visits and transport costs are included. Wait-
ing time and travel time are not included. Informal medical treat-
ment costs, and earning and productivity losses are excluded.
Subsequently, we quantify the FRP beneﬁts brought to house-
holds by each program in dividing the expected private expendi-
tures averted by individual income. An individual income
distribution is proxied while using a Gamma distribution based on
country gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and Gini coefﬁ-
cient (Salem and Mount, 1974; World Development Indicators,
2013), the latter of which describes the distribution of income by
measuring income inequality. The ﬁnancial incentive given to in-
dividuals in the bottom two income quintiles is set at $14, repre-
senting about 10% of an individual's income in the bottom income
quintile (Ranganathan and Lagarde, 2012).2.7. Sensitivity analysis
We checked the robustness of our ﬁndings using both one-way
and multivariate sensitivity analysis. For one-way sensitivity ana-
lyses, we individually varied parameters for costs of treatment and
costs of MCV1 and SIA by ± 50%. These parameters were chosen for
univariate sensitivity testing because they exploit the differences
across the intervention strategies, which is one focus of this study.
In addition, a probabilistic, multivariate sensitivity analysis allowed
all parameters to vary simultaneously, which is a standard
approach to sensitivity analysis using Monte Carlo simulations.
Speciﬁcally, we used Monte Carlo simulations (n ¼ 100,000 trials)
where all key parameters (cost inputs, amount of ﬁnancial incen-
tive, measles mortality, measles case fatality rate, probability of
inpatient/outpatient visit) were varied simultaneously. This
multivariate sensitivity analysis allowed the determination of 95%
uncertainty ranges, which are reported with the results. This
multivariate sensitivity analysis was performed using Gamma dis-
tributions for all cost inputs, amount of ﬁnancial incentive, measles
mortality input and Beta distributions for measles case fatality rate,
probability of inpatient/outpatient visit. All input means were given
in Table 1 while all standard deviations were assumed to be ± 20%
of the input means, except for the amount of ﬁnancial incentive,
measles mortality, case fatality rate and probability of inpatient/
outpatient visit whose standard deviations were ﬁxed at ± 50% of
the input means.
3. Results
Table 2 summarizes the health and ﬁnancial implications of
each vaccination strategy, including the overall impact and the
impact by quintile. The largest number of deaths was averted under
SIAs (39,700), while routine immunizationwith ﬁnancial incentives
averted more than twice as many deaths as the routine immuni-
zation without ﬁnancial incentives (10,300 vs. 4900). This gap was
due to sharp declines in the lower two income quintiles, the target
group for the incentives; in these groups, deaths averted were
almost three times higher under incentives as compared to routine
immunization offered without incentives. Costs, not surprisingly,
increased with coverage and the intensity of effort. The incentive
option ($22,590,000) was estimated to increase costs ten-fold over
the standard routine immunization offering ($2,158,000). The most
expensive undertaking was the SIAs, at over $23 million.
Household expenditures averted were another outcome in
which SIAs had a greater impact. Their four-fold advantage in
averted household expenditures is a natural consequence of the
higher number of individuals reached. This relationship also plays
out when comparing routine immunization with and without
ﬁnancial incentives; expenditures averted are almost three times
higher for the lower two quintiles under the incentive option due to
a similar increase in coverage.
The deﬁning strength of routine immunization with ﬁnancial
incentives is the change in expected household income. The
ﬁnancial transfer augments income in the lower two income
quintiles, leading to 10.5% and 6.0% increases in the ﬁrst and second
quintiles, respectively. The other two delivery mechanisms ach-
ieved expected changes in household income of less than 0.2%.
Finally, the incremental cost-effectiveness ratios (ICERs) balance
the health and government ﬁnancial implications of each option to
present the cost per death averted. This is lowest for routine im-
munizationwithout ﬁnancial incentives and highest for the routine
option with ﬁnancial incentives.
The ﬁndings of the economic evaluation (Table 2) suggest that
the various delivery options are associated with strikingly different
beneﬁts and costs, and this contrast is emphasized in Fig. 1. Routine
Table 2
Extended cost-effectiveness analysis results for each measles immunization program, per income quintile: deaths averted, vaccination costs, household out-of-pocket ex-
penditures averted, percent change in expected income, and incremental cost-effectiveness ratio.
Routine immunization
Income group I II III IV V Total
Deaths averted 1749 (982e2727) 1216 (687e1892) 851 (482e1331) 805 (454e1256) 264 (150e413) 4885 (3751e6199)
Vaccination costs (thousands
of $)
557 (458e666) 483 (396e578) 426 (351e510) 415 (341e496) 276 (231e326) 2158 (1779e2575)
Household expenditures
averted (thousands of $)
59 (25e134) 41 (17e93) 29 (12e65) 27 (12e62) 9 (4e20) 165 (82e342)
Percent change in expected
income
0.021 (0.009e0.046) 0.009 (0.004e0.021) 0.005 (0.002e0.012) 0.004 (0.002e0.009) 0.001 (0.0005e0.003) 0.006 (0.003e0.012)
Incremental cost-
effectiveness ratio ($ per
death averted)
303 (179e565) 382 (228e705) 486 (291e893) 500 (301e922) 1029 (629e1870) 427 (312e586)
Routine immunization supplemented by ﬁnancial incentives
Group I II III IV V Total
Deaths averted 4929 (2768e7687) 3426 (1935e5332) 851 (482e1331) 805 (454e1256) 264 (150e413) 10,276 (7483e13,611)
Vaccination costs (thousands
of $)
11,499 (6772e17,553) 9974 (5874e15,225) 426 (351e510) 415 (341e496) 276 (231e326) 22,590 (13,754e33,910)
Household expenditures
averted (thousands of $)
167 (70e377) 116 (49e262) 29 (12e65) 27 (12e62) 9 (4e20) 348 (168e731)
Percent change in expected
income
10.534 (5.974e16.3) 5.969 (3.382e9.284) 0.005 (0.002e0.012) 0.004 (0.002e0.009) 0.001 (0.0005e0.003) 2.062 (1.170e3.205)
Incremental cost-
effectiveness ratio ($ per
death averted)
2318 (1154e4734) 2896 (1442e5874) 486 (291e893) 500 (301e922) 1029 (629e1870) 2183 (1227e3663)
Supplemental immunization activities
Group I II III IV V Total
Deaths averted 14,216 (7984e22,169) 9882 (5582e15,381) 6918 (3918e10,817) 6544 (3690e10,211) 2149 (1217e3358) 39,708 (30,486e50,384)
Vaccination costs (thousands
of $)
6117 (4957e7411) 5306 (4299e6427) 4681 (3793e5671) 4557 (3692e5520) 2809 (2276e3403) 23,470 (19,017e28,432)
Household expenditures
averted (thousands of $)
481 (202e1086) 335 (140e756) 234 (99e528) 222 (93e501) 73 (31e165) 1345 (664e2784)
Percent change in expected
income
0.040 (0.017e0.090) 0.018 (0.008e0.041) 0.010 (0.004e0.023) 0.008 (0.003e0.017) 0.002 (0.001e0.005) 0.012 (0.006e0.024)
Incremental cost-
effectiveness ratio ($ per
death averted)
415 (246e775) 522 (311e959) 662 (395e1213) 681 (409e1254) 1291 (780e2351) 576 (413e801)
Note: all costs are expressed in 2012 US$; 95% uncertainty ranges extracted from the multivariate sensitivity analysis are given in parentheses.
(a)                                                                        (b) 
MCV1 refers to routine immunization with and without financial incentives (FI), and SIA refers to supplemental 
immunization activities 
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Fig. 1. Extended cost-effectiveness analysis results for each immunization program, per income quintile: (a) deaths averted vs. net programmatic costs; (b) incremental cost-
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Fig. 2. Effect of varying costs on outcomes across vaccination strategies: (a) household expenditures with varying treatment costs; (b) ICERs with varying vaccination costs.
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terms of the magnitude of investment required, and their beneﬁts
are both dramatic and divergent. SIAs achieve a greater health
impact across all quintiles, while the routine immunization with
ﬁnancial incentives results in more modest health gains overall but
did create additional demand in households in the lower two
quintiles, which ultimately generated dramatic welfare improve-
ments through increased income due to the incentives.
Univariate sensitivity analyses, shown in Fig. 2, mostly pre-
served the relationships among the interventions. Household ex-
penditures were relatively unaffected by uncertainty in treatment
costs. The relative magnitude of the ICERs across the delivery
platforms was sensitive to uncertainty in vaccination costs; while
still much higher for the routine immunization with ﬁnancial in-
centives option among the lower two income quintiles due to the
transfer involved, the relative cost per death averted is naturally
sensitive to the cost of the respective interventions. For example,
while in the baseline scenario SIAs had a higher ICER than the
routine and ﬁnancial incentives scenarios for the three highest
income quintiles, signiﬁcant increases in the cost of MCV1 or de-
creases in the cost of SIAs reversed that relationship.
4. Discussion
The results suggest that there is no single superior strategy; the
relative value of these approaches is dependent on the priorities of
policymakers. Timing inﬂuences these preferences in several ways.
Practically, the cost burdens of these strategies have different time
dynamics. SIAs, conducted cyclically, require signiﬁcant intense
investment for each cycle, whereas adding ﬁnancial incentives to
routine immunization is likely to require more evenly distributed
investment over time. Thus, preferences around these two ap-
proaches are a function of more than just policymaker preference,
and will also be inﬂuenced by practical limitations such as short-
term affordability and resource constraints.
Another determinant of the relative appeal of SIAs and routine
immunizationwith ﬁnancial incentives is the timing of the beneﬁts.
The impact of SIAs will necessarily be felt more immediately, as
they have demonstrated success in rapidly boosting vaccinationcoverage. A similar investment in routine immunizations with
ﬁnancial incentives will achieve a smaller boost in vaccination
coverage but has the potential for greater social impacts by clus-
tering demand creation among more vulnerable households. The
broader social beneﬁts of ﬁnancial incentives will take longer to
accrue and will manifest in more diverse ways. This is a natural
consequence of the design of this type of demand-side approach, in
which the transfer not only offsets the cost of procuring the
vaccination, but also more broadly empowers families economi-
cally. This transfer could be re-invested in health, education, or
physical capital, all of which would generate less immediate pay-
offs. Thus, the discount factor attached to this type of policy deci-
sion is a signiﬁcant determinant of the value of long-run beneﬁts
relative to more immediate payoffs.
In addition, if value is deﬁned speciﬁcally in terms of vaccination
coverage gains then SIAs would clearly offer a better return; how-
ever, if value is allowed to be multi-faceted, the use of ﬁnancial in-
centives becomes more attractive since the potential health, human
capital and economic beneﬁts would receive more weight. In addi-
tion, bolstering routine immunizationswithﬁnancial incentivesmay
represent an investment in the broader health system, while mobi-
lizing the workforce to conduct SIAs might have a detrimental
impact on provision of other health services (Grifﬁths et al., 2011;
Hanvoravongchai et al., 2011; Verguet et al., 2013a). Thus, these
two strategiesmay have different proﬁles in terms of their impact on
the health system, one which mirrors the tension between vertical
and horizontal health interventions. These considerations may be
summarized as the scope of impact and the scope of investment, and
they will largely be a function of the policy environment.
Despite stark differences in timing of costs and beneﬁts and type
of beneﬁts realized, SIAs and ﬁnancial incentives have similar
distributional properties. While the use of ﬁnancial incentives is
clearly designed to create demand and mobilize lower-income
households, SIAs have also been found to improve equity
(Vijayaraghavan et al., 2007). This is largely attributed to the inverse
correlation between health care access and socioeconomic status;
SIAs directly mediate the proximity barrier. In addition, both ap-
proaches to vaccination can be expanded to include additional
health interventions. Financial incentives have traditionally been
J. Driessen et al. / Social Science & Medicine 139 (2015) 115e122 121attached to a bundle of services, and thus may impact not only
vaccination rates but also other healthcare services, such as routine
check-ups, and educational outcomes, such as school attendance.
SIAs can be similarly expanded to improve access to not only vac-
cinations, but also interventions such as bednets, vitamin A sup-
plements, and deworming (Grabowsky, et al., 2005a; Grabowsky,
et al., 2005b; Johri et al., 2013), which would diminish the previ-
ously mentioned concern about this strategy diverting resources
from existing health services.
The comparative results suggest a tradeoff between ICER
maximization and distributional effects that prioritize health and
ﬁnancial gains in poorer households. One way to represent this
tradeoff in a single indicator is to calculate the net monetary value
of each intervention relative to total household income. The mon-
etary value of each death is based on the value of a statistical life,
using the standard approach of converting the United States-
derived value to an Ethiopia equivalent using the ratio of their
GDP per capita and an income elasticity of 1.5 (Viscusi and Aldy,
2003). Fig. 3 presents this indicator, by quintile, for each inter-
vention. This measure suggests that ﬁnancial incentives offer the
most relative value to poorer households, those who are eligible for
the incentive, while SIAs deliver the highest relative value for
higher-income households.
Our ﬁndings rely on a static model of disease transmission. One
limitation of this approach is that it does not consider indirect
protection or herd immunity. For example, herd immunity may be
relevant at high levels of coverage, such as those achieved in the
highest income quintile in P1 and P2. If transmission between in-
come quintiles is common, then vaccination may have a relatively
greater impact among the lower income quintiles through herd
immunity as a result of the higher vaccination rates in the higher
income quintiles. Conversely, if transmission is conﬁned within
income quintiles, the disparities between quintiles may increase as
the indirect beneﬁts remain concentrated within the upper quin-
tiles. However, we had no empirical basis for understanding and
informing transmission between quintiles.MCV1 refers to routine immunization with and without 
financial incentives (FI), and SIA refers to supplemental 
immunization activities 
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Fig. 3. Net monetary value of interventions relative to household income, by quintile.This comparison of strategies to boost measles immunization
coverage is timely given the momentum behind measles eradica-
tion. While the early part of the last decade saw targets to
dramatically reduce measles-related deaths, there also has been a
substantial push to aim for a full eradication of measles (Strebel et
al., 2011; Quadros, 2004; World Health Organization, 2010). This
type of goal will require substantial additional investment in
measles immunization, and this paper presents two very different
approaches to bolstering coverage rates. While SIAs are a more
traditional approach to improving vaccine coverage, ﬁnancial in-
centives have demonstrated success in other policy arenas in
addition to some limited evidence of increasing demand for timely
vaccination. Assuming that ﬁnancial incentives are able to signiﬁ-
cantly boost coverage among the more economically disadvan-
taged, as was assumed in this paper, this approach could be used to
target these households, which have lower levels of vaccination
coverage. Another, more hybrid policy approach would be a com-
bination of routine immunization with ﬁnancial incentives and
SIAs. While possibly less efﬁcient, this approach would recognize
differences in suitability and impact across different groups, and
harness the beneﬁts of both.
5. Conclusions
This paper applied ECEA to evaluate different strategies to
improve measles vaccination coverage in Ethiopia. In addition to
the standard options of routine immunization services and SIAs,
the use of ﬁnancial incentives was introduced based on evidence
from the CCT literature that this type of program increases demand
for child health services. ECEA was a particularly appropriate
method in this regard, since it intrinsically captured variation in the
health and economic beneﬁts of each strategy by income quintile.
Ultimately, no one strategy was superior in terms of both health
and economic beneﬁts. SIAs and routine immunization with
ﬁnancial incentives required similar levels of investment, with SIAs
delivering a more sizable reduction in measles-related deaths and
ﬁnancial incentives bringing about greater economic improve-
ments. These are the types of strategies that are relevant for mea-
sles eradication, and the relative attractiveness of these two
alternatives will largely depend on characteristics of the funding
climate and the degree to which immunization policymaking is
conducted in concert with the broader health system strengthening
and social agendas.
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